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Abstract. We investigate the behavior of experts who seek to make predictions with maximum impact
on an audience. At a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. A public
prediction gradually converges to the outcome, and an expert has access to a more accurate prediction.
We study when the expert should reveal his information, when his reward is based on a proper scoring
rule (e.g., is proportional to the change in log-likelihood of the outcome).
In Azar et al. (2016), we analyzed the case where the expert may make a single prediction. In this
paper, we analyze the case where the expert is allowed to revise previous predictions. This leads to a
rather different set of dilemmas for the strategic expert. We find that it is optimal for the expert to
always tell the truth, and to make a new prediction whenever he has a new signal. We characterize the
expert’s expectation for his total reward, and show asymptotic limits.
1 Introduction
Situations where a public is interested in the value of a future continuous variable, and has a time-
varying consensus estimate of it, are common. Examples abound: Futures and options markets, the
weather or climate, results of sport competitions, election results, new book / movie / album sales
(for example, the Hollywood Stock Exchange), or economic indicators (for example, Moody’s). We
analyze the problem of an expert who makes multiple public predictions in such situations, and in
particular, the questions of when to make a first prediction, when to revise a previous prediction,
and whether to reveal true beliefs when making a prediction.
Consider, for example, a futures market. A futures market is an exchange where people make
contracts to buy specific quantities of a commodity or financial instrument at a specified price with
delivery set at a specified time in the future. Traders make money by buying for less than the
market’s spot price on the delivery date, which we shall henceforth call the outcome, or by selling
for more. In effect, a futures market is a prediction market for the outcome.
The expert is not a trader himself, but someone who is reputed to have access to a more accurate
signal than possessed by regular traders. Often, his reputation and living is based on this. Stock
market analysts, investment gurus and various types of journalists fit this description.
The expert contributes to the market by making a public prediction, and is post factum rewarded
for it. Such a prediction is a significant market event: Clearly, a market should heed an expert whose
prediction already encompasses all current common knowledge and adds to it. We shall below argue
that proper scoring rules, and in particular the logarithmic scoring rule, are the right incentive for
the prediction scenario described. Whether the expert’s reward takes the form of actual payment,
or less tangibly in a boost to his reputation as an expert, is immaterial to our discussion. We assume
that the expert’s level of expertise, which we measure by quality and describe below, is known to
the market.
We investigate the expert’s strategy in such a prediction market. The strategy consists of choos-
ing the timing and truthfulness of his predictions. Our treatment is Bayesian, assuming all agents
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Fig. 1. Time-dependent signals of a market, a typical expert (q = 0.6), a know-all expert (q = 1), and a know-nothing
expert (q = 0)
draw all possible inferences from their information. In Azar et al. (2016), we analyzed the case where
the expert is allowed a single prediction. In this paper, we study the case of multiple predictions,
where an expert is allowed to revise his previous prediction.
1.1 The Market as a Random Walk
The current price in a futures market represents a current consensus on the outcome (assume
that interest rates, or inflation rates, have been incorporated into the price). According to the
efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), the current price represents all currently available information,
and therefore it is impossible to consistently outperform the market. Consistent with the EMH is
the random-walk hypothesis, according to which stock market prices (and their derivatives) evolve
according to a random walk and thus cannot be predicted. By the random-walk hypothesis, the
outcome is the result of a random walk from the current market price. Equivalently, and the point
of view we take in this paper, the current price is the result of a random walk, reversed in time,
from the outcome (see Figure 1).
A random walk adds periodical (say, daily) i.i.d. steps to the market price. Assuming prices
have been adjusted for known trends, the steps have zero mean. By suitable scaling of the price,
the step variance can be normalized to 1. Following a common assumption that the random walk
is Gaussian, or lognormal4, the steps have standard normal distribution (i.e., N(0, 1)).
1.2 Expert Quality
The expert’s expertise consists of having a more accurate signal of the outcome price x0 than the
market’s, and the expert’s quality measures by how much. The quality q ∈ [0, 1] measures what
part of the market’s uncertainty the expert “knows”, so that it does not figure in the expert’s
own uncertainty. Equivalently, the expert’s uncertainty is 1 − q of the market’s uncertainty. This
proportion is statistical: It is the uncertainties’ variances, rather than their realizations, that are
related by proportion. If the market price is a Gaussian random walk from the outcome with N(0, 1)
steps, the expert’s prediction is a Gaussian random walk from the outcome with N(0, 1− q) steps.
4 Taking logs transforms a lognormal random walk into a Gaussian one.
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The expert’s knowledge, i.e., the part of the market’s uncertainty that the expert is not uncertain
about, has steps of zero mean and q variance. On the assumption that the expert’s knowledge steps
and uncertainty steps are mutually independent, their sum has the sum mean and sum variance
of their parts, i.e., they sum back to the market’s uncertainty steps of zero mean and variance
q + (1− q) = 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of a market’s signal in the last 20 periods until the outcome
(109) becomes known. Also shown are the private signals of 3 experts predicting the same event,
with qualities of 0.6, 1 and 0.
An expert with q = 1 has no uncertainty at all, and his signal equals the outcome x0 at all
times t. At the other extreme, a (so-called) expert with q = 0 has no knowledge beyond common
knowledge, and his signal equals the market value xt at all t.
In this paper an expert’s quality is common knowledge, shared by all traders as well as himself.
Whether its value q represents objective reality, or is a belief, based, e.g., on past performance,
makes no difference to our discussion.
1.3 Scoring a Prediction
A scoring rule is a way to evaluate and reward a prediction of a stochastic event, when that
prediction is presented as a distribution over possible results. The predictor declares at time t > 0
a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(R), and at time 0 some r ∈ R is realized. A scoring rule S rewards
the predictor S(p, r) when his prediction was p and the realized value is r. In market settings, and
many other settings, there exists a current prediction p¯ and then the predictor is evaluated on the
scoring difference effected S(p, r)− S(p¯, r). Note that the optimization problem of the predictor in
a market situation is the same, since he has no influence over S(p¯, r), the only difference is that
now the predictor might be penalized for making the current prediction less accurate. A proper
scoring rule is a scoring rule for which reporting the true distribution is optimal according to the
predictor’s information.
The logarithmic scoring rule, with S(p, r) = log pr (where pr is the value of PDF p at r), scores
a prediction by the log-likelihood of the outcome according to the prediction. It is proper, and has
strong roots in information theory: In reference to a current prediction p¯, it scores log pr/p¯r, which,
in information theory, is the self-information, also called surprisal, contained in the outcome. Con-
ditional on p being the correct distribution, the expected score is the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between p and p¯: Er∼p[log pr/p¯r] = DKL(p||p¯).
In our model expert predictions are scored with the logarithmic scoring rule, which the expert
seeks to maximize. This is justified by the following
– The reward is incentive compatible, eliciting truth-telling by the expert. This enables a Bayesian
market to adopt predictions verbatim. A reward that is not incentive compatible would greatly
complicate the Bayesian interpretation of predictions, possibly even making our problem inde-
terminate.
– In our model (the essential details of which were already sketched), the entire prediction distri-
bution follows from the prediction mean by common knowledge. Since only proper scoring rules
are incentive compatible with predictions phrased as distributions over results, it follows that
the reward must be by a proper scoring rule.
– The logarithmic scoring rule is favored by its unique information-theory meaning, and other
unique attributes (e.g., its locality). It is commonly used in real-world predictions markets, in
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a mechanism called LMSR (Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule) introduced by Hanson (2003).
Chen and Pennock (2010) say “LMSR has become the de facto market maker mechanism for
prediction markets. It is used by many companies including Inkling Markets, Consensus Point,
Yahoo!, and Microsoft”.
Proper scoring rules are myopically incentive compatible for risk-neutral agents, i.e. they are
guaranteed to elicit the truth, but only when future actions are not taken into account (or, when
there are no future actions, i.e., at the last prediction). As will be further discussed, when future
actions are taken into account, incentive compatibility is not guaranteed.
1.4 The Expert’s Dilemma
Assume that the expert has no obligation to speak at any particular time, or at all. The reward
for no prediction is zero, and for each prediction made, the expert is rewarded by the logarithmic
scoring rule. The expert may revise his previous prediction by making a new one whenever this is
advantageous. The expert faces several dilemmas: When to make the first prediction? and when
is it appropriate to revise a previous prediction? Moreover, as proper scoring rules are incentive
compatible only with the last prediction, is there a strategy more profitable than always telling the
truth?
In Azar et al. (2016), we analyzed the single-prediction case, and argued that an expert may
pass on making a prediction in the hope of getting a better opportunity later. In the multiple
predictions scenario, there is no need to pass, since the opportunity to make a future prediction
remains. Conceivably, the expert will want to revise his prediction whenever he gets a fresh signal
(we find that this is so), or, he may want to do so only when the new signal significantly changes
his prediction (we find otherwise).
Should he always tell the truth? Whenever the expert makes two or more predictions, he may
conceivably distort his first prediction, hoping to misdirect a gullibly-Bayesian market, and reaping
a net profit by subsequently setting the market right.
1.5 Summary of Results
Our results are satisfyingly tidy: Despite apparent temptation to mislead, it is optimal for the
expert to always tell the truth, and therefore it is rational for the market to take his predictions at
face value. The optimal prediction schedule for the expert is to make a new one whenever he has
a new signal and is allowed to speak. We show that the expected total reward for all predictions
is, asymptotically for large t, 12q log t, proportional to quality (q) and to the log of the number of
periods left (t).
To some, these results, and especially the truthfulness result, would seem straightforward. How-
ever, this intuition is false, and not supported by the literature (see below in Section 1.6, Chen
et al. (2010) and Chen and Waggoner (2016)). The following generic example illustrates why.
Example 1. There is a market, who gets public signals, and an expert, who gets private signals.
Suppose that at time t the market receives a signal x0 + , where x0 is the outcome, and  is
a random variable. At t− 1, and (independently) at t+ 1, the expert receives a signal x0 +  with
probability 1/2, and x0 −  with probability 1/2.
The expert makes a prediction at both times. Should he reveal his true information?
4
Whoever sees two different truthful signals is able to calculate the outcome x0 = (x0 + )/2 +
(x0 − )/2 exactly.
For any scoring rule, and any distribution of , the expert should not tell the truth on his first
prediction. This prevents the 50% probability that the market will know x0 at t, preserving a 75%
probability that the expert can announce x0 on his second prediction.
1.6 Related Literature
Learning from expert opinion and its aggregation has a long history, with DeGroot (1974) and
the Bayesian framework by Morris (Morris (1974), Morris (1977)) leading to much subsequent
work. While much of this work treats experts as oracles with no motivation of their own, some
of it took a look at an expert’s concern for his reputation, i.e., the wish to appear well-informed.
In Bayarri and DeGroot (1989) the setting was a weighted averaging of several expert opinions,
with the weights adjusted by observed accuracy when the outcome is known. Experts wish to
maximize their posterior weight. The authors found that incentive compatibility is attainable only
by assigning a logarithmic utility to the weight. In Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006b) and Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2006a) the authors cast the expert’s inferred type as the optimization target. Their
type, a real number, is a cognate of our quality. The authors argue that truth-telling is generally
not possible, as experts are motivated to simulate better quality than they actually have. In our
model, expert quality is common knowledge, and so not open to manipulation.
The question of timing has received attention from Kreps and Porteus (1978), who laid out
a basis for the temporal resolution of uncertainty in dynamic choices. Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2001) discuss the optimal order of speaking to avoid herding in a committee where members have
heterogenous expertise.
Chen et al. (2010) as well as Chen and Waggoner (2016) studied situations where several agents,
each having private information, are given more than one opportunity to make a public prediction.
The canonical case is “Alice-Bob-Alice” where Alice speaks before and after Bob’s single speaking
opportunity, both are awarded by a proper scoring rule for each prediction, and both maximize their
total score. The proper scoring rule assures that each will tell the truth on their last prediction,
and the open question is whether Alice, when going first, will tell the truth, lie, or keep her silence.
Chen et al. (2010) show cases where Alice is motivated to mislead on her first prediction, and make
the key observation that truthfulness is optimal if, in a different setup, namely, a single-prediction
Alice-Bob game where Alice chooses whether to go first or second, she will always prefer going first.
Building on that insight, Chen and Waggoner (2016) show that when the players’ information is
what they define as “perfect informational substitutes”, they will predict truthfully and as early
as allowed, while when they are “perfect informational complements”, they will predict truthfully
and as late as allowed, while when players are neither substitutes nor complements, untruthfulness
can and will occur.
These works differ from ours in that they model agents having a constant piece of information,
which they may choose when to reveal, while we model agents (expert and market) as receiving
a time series of signals with new information every time period. (And the martingale property of
random walks assures that the new information cannot be predicted from old). In the Discussion
we comment on how our results reflect on a possible generalization of the mentioned works to
dynamic-information settings.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was introduced by Fama et al. (1969). The Random Walk
Hypothesis is even older, originating in the 19th century, and discussed by, e.g., Samuelson (1965)
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and Fama (1965). The Black-Scholes option pricing model Black and Scholes (1973) is based on a
Gaussian random walk assumption.
Scoring rules have a very long history, going back to De Finetti (1937), Brier (1950) and Good
(1952). Proper scoring rules are often used for incentive-compatible belief elicitation of risk-neutral
agents (e.g. Armantier and Treich (2013)).
1.7 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our model. After establishing
some preliminary results in Section 3, Section 4 is devoted to the multiple-prediction problem. In
Section 5 we summarize and offer concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Market Prediction
A market predicts the outcome of a continuous random variable X0, whose realized value x0 will
be revealed at time 0. Time is discrete and flows backwards from an initial period Tmax, i.e.,
Tmax, . . . , t, . . . , 1, 0. At any time t > 0 the market observes X0 +Zt where Zt ∼ N(0, t). We model
Zt as a random walk with i.i.d. steps Zt, . . . , Z1, i.e., Zt =
∑t
τ=1 Zτ and Zτ ∼ N(0, 1). Let the
market prediction (when uninformed by experts) be Xt := X0 + Zt at time t, and let xt be the
realized value. With every passing period t, the value of Zt = zt is revealed and becomes common
knowledge, and the market’s new prediction changes to xt−1 = xt − zt. Note that the variance
of Zt decreases with time, and at time 0 the market’s prediction coincides with the outcome x0.
The random variable X0 is normally distributed N(0, σ
2
0) where we assume σ
2
0  Tmax. This
assumption means that the outcome is, for practical purposes, unconstrained by a prior, and makes
posterior computations dependent solely on observed signals, since5 we have E[X0|Xt = xt] = xt
and V ar(X0|Xt = xt) = t.
2.2 Expert Information and Goal
There is an expert, with quality q ∈ [0, 1], whose quality is common knowledge. The expert’s quality
consists in “knowing” part of the random steps Zt of every period, and therefore getting a more
accurate signal of X0. Formally,
– For every t, Zt = At +Bt, where At ∼ N(0, q) and Bt ∼ N(0, 1− q) are mutually independent.
(Note that Zt ∼ N(0, 1).)
– The expert’s private signal at time t is Yt = X0 +B1 + . . .+Bt and let yt be its realized value.
(Note that if q = 0 then Yt = Xt and if q = 1 then Yt = x0.)
At every t > 0, the expert may choose to make a prediction of the outcome. The market
has a varying probability distribution on the outcome, which is affected by its signals and by the
expert’s predictions. (The market price is the distribution mean). Each prediction is scored by the
5 When a normal variable with prior distribution N(0, σ20) is sampled with known variance t at value xt, its Bayesian
posterior distribution is normal with mean xt/t
1/σ20+1/t
and variance 1
1/σ20+1/t
. Assuming σ20  Tmax ≥ t, this simplifies
to N(xt, t).
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logarithmic scoring rule as described below. The expert’s reward is the total score for all predictions
made.
The expert’s outcome distribution at t is N(yt, (1 − q)t).6 In practice, it is enough for the
expert to announce yt as his entire distribution follows by the model and common knowledge. A
prediction’s reward is determined at time 0 based on the realized value (x0) by the logarithmic
scoring rule. Namely, if the market distribution prior to the expert prediction is Xt− with density
f−, and following the expert prediction the posterior market distribution is Xt+ with density f+,
then the expert reward is log(f+(x0)/f−(x0)), where x0 is the realized value.
An expert who refrains from making any prediction is awarded 0. The expert optimization
problem is to maximize his expected reward given his private information. The question before the
expert is if and when to make predictions, and, when allowed multiple predictions, whether to be
truthful in his predictions.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Time and Expectation Notation
Distributions and other variables often use a time subscript, e.g., Xt is market’s distribution at t
(t periods before delivery date). When a prediction takes place at t, the notation Xt−, Xt+ is used
to distinguish between the variable before, and after, respectively, the prediction.
We use the notation E
t
[Z] to denote the expectation of a random variable Z according to the
distribution known at t. This is shorthand for E
Xt
[Z] when referring to the market’s expectation, or
for E
Yt
[Z] when referring to the expert’s expectation. Which of the two is meant will either be clear
from the context or explicitly stated. If a prediction was made at t, we use the notation E
t−
[Z], E
t+
[Z]
to distinguish between the market’s expectation of Z before and after, respectively, the prediction
has been made.
3.2 A Criterion for Independence
Here we prove a result about random variables based on model signals that will enable us to
determine whether they are stochastically independent.
From the model definitions we have, for every i ≥ j
Cov(Xi, Xj) = j (1)
Cov(Yi, Xj) = Cov(Xi, Yj) = Cov(Yi, Yj) = (1− q)j (2)
Lemma 1. Define U to be the random vector
(X0, X1, Y1, . . . , Xt, Yt)
T , and let U1,U2 be two random vectors of linear combinations of the U .
Then the joint distributions of U1,U2 are mutually independent if and only if for every pair u1 ∈ U1
and u2 ∈ U2 Cov(u1, u2) = 0.
6 Since the expert is better informed than the market, his prediction depends on his signal alone. This is formally
proved in Proposition 1.
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Proof. Every linear combination of U is normal, as it is a linear combination of the i.i.d. normal
variables Ai, Bi, i = 1, . . . t, and of X0, which is normal and independent of each of the others.
Therefore U has a jointly multivariate normal distribution. Therefore so has random vector
(
U1
U2
)
.
The lemma states a general property of jointly multivariate normal distributions, see Tong (2012)
Theorem 3.3.2. uunionsq
3.3 Market Effect of a Prediction
Before evaluating, and then optimizing, expert’s value for a prediction strategy, we must resolve
how a single prediction affects market price, at the time of prediction. For the multiple-prediction
problem, we also need to determine the effect after the prediction was made. This will be resolved
in Section 4.1.
Define Zt to be the set of all expert and market signals previous to t (Xτ , Yτ for τ > t).
Assume the expert makes a prediction yt at time t, implying a distribution of Yt ∼ N(yt, (1−q)t).
Then at time t the market’s posterior distribution will be the expert’s announced distribution,
regardless of the market’s signal at this time xt and all previous signals Zt.
Proposition 1. If the expert makes a prediction yt at time t, the market’s posterior distribution
is the expert’s implied distribution Yt ∼ N(yt, (1− q)t).
Proof. Let Z = Zt∪{Xt}. Define Z ′ = Z−Yt to be the set of random variables Z−Yt with Z ∈ Z.
As given Yt there is a one-to-one correspondence between Z and Z ′
Pr[x0|Yt,Z] = Pr[x0|Yt,Z ′]
By (1), (2) for each Z ∈ Z ′, Cov(Z, Yt) = 0 and Cov(Z,X0) = 0. So by Lemma 1
Pr[x0|Yt,Z ′] = Pr[x0, Yt,Z
′]
Pr[Yt,Z ′] =
Pr[x0, Yt] Pr[Z ′]
Pr[Yt] Pr[Z ′] = Pr[x0|Yt]
Therefore, as claimed
Pr[x0|Yt,Z] = Pr[x0|Yt]
uunionsq
3.4 Prediction Score Expectation
Assume the expert makes a prediction at time t. Let the market prediction prior to the expert
prediction be Xt− ∼ N(µ−, σ2−) with density f− and let the posterior market prediction be Xt+ ∼
N(µ+, σ
2
+) with density f+. Let expert’s reward be denoted by W , then
W = log
f+(x0)
f−(x0)
= log
1
σ+
√
2pi
e
− (x0−µ+)
2
2σ2+
1
σ−
√
2pi
e
− (x0−µ−)2
2σ2−
= log
σ−
σ+
+
(x0 − µ−)2
2σ2−
− (x0 − µ+)
2
2σ2+
(3)
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As the reward depends on x0, its value is only known at time 0. The expert can calculate his reward
expectation when making it (at t), based on his belief about the distribution of x0.
Consider the case that the expert prediction is truthful, so that by Proposition 1 after it his
beliefs of x0 are identical to the market’s.
Proposition 2. If the market’s prediction before an expert prediction is Xt− ∼ N(µ−, σ2−), and
after an expert prediction is Xt+ ∼ N(µ+, σ2+), then if the prediction is truthful the expert’s expected
reward is positive and equals the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(Xt+||Xt−).
E
t
[W ] = DKL(Xt+||Xt−) = (µ+ − µ−)
2
2σ2−
+
1
2
(σ2+
σ2−
− 1− log σ
2
+
σ2−
)
(4)
Proof. As the second moment of the normal distribution N(µ, σ2) is µ2+σ2, and since the expert’s
distribution translates to
x0 − µ− ∼ N(µ+ − µ−, σ2+)
x0 − µ+ ∼ N(0, σ2+),
we get by taking expectations from (3)
E
t
[W ] = E
x0∼N(µ+,σ2+)
[W ] = log
σ−
σ+
+
(µ+ − µ−)2 + σ2+
2σ2−
− 0 + σ
2
+
2σ2+
=
(µ+ − µ−)2
2σ2−
+
1
2
(σ2+
σ2−
− 1− log σ
2
+
σ2−
)
This is positive, because for every x < 1, log(1− x) ≤ −x uunionsq
We apply the above result to calculate the expected reward of a first prediction.
Proposition 3. For an expert’s first prediction at t, his reward expectation is
E
t
[W ] =
(xt − yt)2
2t
− 1
2
(
q + log(1− q)
)
(5)
Proof. For an expert’s first prediction, we have µ− = xt, σ2− = t. By Proposition 1 µ+ = yt, and
σ2+ = (1− q)t. Hence, X−t ∼ N(xt, t) and X+t ∼ N(yt, (1− q)t). Substituting these in (4) we derive
(5). uunionsq
Note that the reward W may be positive or negative depending on x0, but its expectation is always
non-negative.
4 The Optimal Multiple-Prediction Strategy
4.1 Market Effect after a Prediction
When an expert has made a prediction at T , what is the market’s posterior distribution at the next
periods T −1, T −2, . . ., assuming the expert makes no new predictions? This is more complex than
at the time of prediction (see Section 3.3), and the distribution depends on more than one signal,
as stated in the following proposition
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Proposition 4. At time t, Let T > t be the time of expert’s latest prediction yT . Let Z := ZT ∪
{yT , xT , xT−1, . . . xt}. Then at t the market’s posterior distribution is
N(µ(x0|Z), V ar(x0|Z)) with
µ(x0|Z) =
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
V ar(x0|Z) = 11
t +
q
1−q
1
T
Proof. In outline, the proof is based on showing:
1. The distribution of Yt|yT , xT , xt.
2. Pr[Yt|Z] = Pr[Yt|yT , xT , xt], i.e., no observation other than yT , xT , xt affects Yt’s posterior.
3. How the distribution of x0|Z is derived from that of Yt|Z.
Our proof will show the posterior distribution of yt conditional on the same random variables
Z, from which the posterior distribution of x0 will follow by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
µ(x0|Z) = µ(Yt|Z)
V ar(x0|Z) = V ar(Yt|Z) + (1− q)t
Proof. For each Z ∈ Z the value of Z − Yt is independent of Yt − x0. Therefore
µ(x0|Z) = µ(Yt|Z)− µ(Yt − x0)
V ar(x0|Z) = V ar(Yt|Z) + V ar(Yt − x0)
As Yt − x0 =
t∑
i=0
Bi ∼ N(0, (1− q)t), the lemma follows. uunionsq
We will next show the distribution of Yt conditional only on yT , xT , xt. This will be followed by
a proof that these are the only variables in Z that matter.
Lemma 3. Conditional only on yT , xT and xt, the distribution of Yt is normal, with
µ(Yt|yT , xT , xt) =
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
(6)
V ar(Yt|yT , xT , xt) = 11
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
Proof. By the model, the observed variables YT , XT , Xt are related to Yt as follows
Xt = Yt +
t∑
i=0
Ai (7)
XT = Yt +
T∑
i=t+1
Ai +
T∑
i=t+1
Bi +
t∑
i=0
Ai (8)
YT = Yt +
T∑
i=t+1
Bi (9)
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Define a random variable Z := YT −XT +Xt, and let z := yT − xT + xt be its observed value.
Then, by the above
Z = Yt −
T∑
i=t+1
Ai (10)
Now, observing (7), (9) and (10), as
t∑
i=0
Ai,
T∑
i=t+1
Bi and
T∑
i=t+1
Ai are pairwise independent,
xt, yT and z are three observations of Yt with independent “noises”, each with normal distribution
of zero mean, and variances qt, (1− q)(T − t) and q(T − t), respectively. The posterior distribution
of Yt is therefore normal with
µ(Yt|yT , xT , xt) =
xt
qt +
yT
(1−q)(T−t) +
z
q(T−t)
1
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
V ar(Yt|yT , xT , xt) = 11
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
Substituting z = yT − xT + xt and simplifying
µ(Yt|yT , xT , xt) =
xt
qt +
yT
(1−q)(T−t) +
z
q(T−t)
1
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
=
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
which completes the proof. uunionsq
Lemma 4.
Pr(Yt|Z) = Pr(Yt|Xt, XT , YT )
Proof. We write, using Bayes’ rule and the chain rule
Pr[Yt|Z] = Pr[Yt,Z]
Pr[Z]
=
Pr[ZT , Yt, Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT ]
Pr[ZT , Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT ]
= Pr[Yt|Xt, XT , YT ]Pr[ZT , Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT , Yt]
Pr[ZT , Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT ] (11)
Define Z ′ = ZT − YT to be the set of random variables Z − YT with Z ∈ ZT , and for every
τ ∈ [t+ 1, T − 1] define
Rτ :=
τ − t
T − t(Xτ −XT ) +
T − τ
T − t (Xτ −Xt)
As given Xt, XT there is a one-to-one correspondence between Xτ and Rτ , and given YT there
is a one-to-one correspondence between ZT and Z ′
Pr[ZT , Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT , Yt] =
Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1|Xt, XT , YT , Yt] (12)
Pr[ZT , Xt+1, . . . , XT−1|Xt, XT , YT ] =
Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1|Xt, XT , YT ] (13)
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By (1), (2)
Cov(Rτ , Xt) =
τ − t
T − t(t− t) +
T − τ
T − t (t− t) = 0
Cov(Rτ , Yt) =
τ − t
T − t(1− q)(t− t) +
T − τ
T − t (1− q)(t− t) = 0
Cov(Rτ , XT ) =
τ − t
T − t(τ − T ) +
T − τ
T − t (τ − t) = 0
Cov(Rτ , YT ) =
τ − t
T − t(1− q)(τ − T ) +
T − τ
T − t (1− q)(τ − t) = 0
Also, for every Z ∈ Z ′ and every τ ≤ T , Cov(Z,Xτ ) = Cov(Z, Yτ ) = 0.
Consequently, applying Lemma 1
Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1|Xt, XT , YT , Yt] = Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1]
Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1|Xt, XT , YT ] = Pr[Z ′, Rt+1, . . . , RT−1]
Substituting the above in (12), (13), (11), Pr[Yt|Z] = Pr[Yt|Xt, XT , YT ], as claimed. uunionsq
A corollary of Lemma 4 and Lemma 3 is that (6) is a sufficient statistic for yt given the random
variables Z.
The proof of the proposition is now easily concluded: From Lemma 4 with Lemma 3 we conclude
µ(Yt|Z) =
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
V ar(Yt|Z) = 11
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
Combining the above with Lemma 2,
µ(x0|Z) =
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
V ar(x0|Z) = 11
qt +
1
(1−q)(T−t) +
1
q(T−t)
+ (1− q)t = 11
t +
q
1−q
1
T
as claimed. uunionsq
4.2 Truth is Best Policy
Does an expert gain or lose by deviating from the truth, reporting a prediction that is different
from his actual belief? When allowed a single prediction, the fact that the logarithmic scoring
rule is proper means that the expert’s optimal policy is to predict truthfully. If allowed multiple
predictions, this is not clear-cut: A false prediction misdirects the market, so that a subsequent
true prediction reaps the added benefit of correcting the misdirection. Plausibly, the gain of the
latter outweighs the loss of the former.
We shall, however, show
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Proposition 5. If allowed periods when to predict are fixed, it is an equilibrium for the expert to
make truthful predictions and for the market to take his predictions as truthful.
Proof. It is enough to show that if the market takes the expert’s prediction as truthful, the expert
cannot improve his expected reward by untruthfulness.
If the expert makes a single prediction, the result follows from the fact that the logarithmic scor-
ing rule is proper. Therefore, assume more than one prediction, and let us focus on any consecutive
pair of predictions.
Assume that an expert makes two consecutive predictions at times T and t < T . The timing of
the latter prediction at t need not be known at T . It may depend on the expert’s policy and signals
revealed later than T . Given the expert’s policy, at T , t ∈ ∆([T − 1]) is a random variable whose
realization is conditioned on signals known after T .7
Let the market prediction at T prior to an expert prediction be XT− ∼ N(µT−, σ2T−). If the ex-
pert makes a truthful prediction, let the market’s posterior prediction at T be XT+ ∼ N(µT+, σ2T+),
and the market’s prior prediction at t be Xt− ∼ N(µt−, σ2t−). If the expert predicts truthfully at t,
let the market’s posterior prediction at t be Xt+ ∼ N(µt+, σ2t+).
Lemma 5. Assume that the expert misrepresents his prediction mean at T by an amount cT and
that, as a result, the market’s prior prediction mean at t, inferred from the (wrong) assumption that
the expert is truthful, is distorted by ct. Then the expert’s net gain/loss expectation (at T ) from the
misrepresentation is
E
T
[∆W ] = E
T
[ c2t
2σ2t−
]
− c
2
T
2σ2T+
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 4, the expert’s prediction variance is independent of any signal or
predicted value. The expert’s inferred variance is therefore unaffected by truthfulness.
We also observe in Proposition 4 that ct, the difference made to µ(x0|Z) by the expert declaring
yT + cT rather than yT , is proportional to cT and is independent of any expert or market signal.
For, by Propositions 1 and 4
σ2T+ = (1− q)T
σ2t− =
1
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
and therefore
ct =
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT+cT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
−
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
=
σ2t−
σ2T+
cT (14)
By Propositions 1 and 4 again, the market’s prediction is affected only by the expert prediction
that immediately preceded it, and does not depend on any earlier predictions. Therefore a false
prediction at T has no effect on the expert’s reward for any prediction made later than t or earlier
than T . Furthermore, for the two affected rewards at T, t, only some terms are affected: Referring to
(3), a false prediction at time T affects only the term − (x0−µ+)2
2σ2+
at T , and only the term + (x0−µ−)
2
2σ2−
at t.
7 It is here that the assumption that prediction periods are fixed is used. If not, t may conditionally not exist.
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We calculate the expectation E
T
[·] of the difference the false prediction makes to each of these
two affected terms, i.e., the expectation at T taken over the expert’s true distribution.
– Difference to reward at T :
In the affected term − (x0−µ+)2
2σ2+
, note that µ+ = µT+ if the expert predicted truthfully, while
µ+ = µT+ + cT if he lied about his mean.
The reward expectation difference, according to the expert’s distribution at T , is therefore
E
T
[
−(x0 − µT+ − cT )
2
2σ2T+
+
(x0 − µT+)2
2σ2T+
]
=
−c2T + 2cT E
T
[x0 − µT+]
2σ2T+
= − c
2
T
2σ2T+
(15)
– Difference to reward at t:
In the affected term + (x0−µ−)
2
2σ2−
, note that µ− = µt− if the expert predicted truthfully, while
µ− = µt− + ct if he lied about his mean.
The reward expectation difference, according to the expert’s distribution at T , is therefore
E
T
[(x0 − µt− − ct)2
2σ2t−
− (x0 − µt−)
2
2σ2t−
]
=
E
T
[ c2t
2σ2t−
]
− E
T
[ct(x0 − µt−)
σ2t−
]
(16)
From (14), ct
σ2t−
= cT
σ2T+
is a non-random constant (given information known at T ). Therefore
E
T
[ct(x0 − µt−)
σ2t−
]
=
cT
σ2T+
E
T
[x0 − µt−]
To evaluate E
T
[x0 − µt−], observe that Xt− is a conditional distribution on XT+. By the Law of
Total Expectation
E
T+
[E
t−
[Xt−]] = E
T+
[XT+]
I.e.,
E
T+
[µt−] = E
T
[µt−] = µT+
since E
T
[x0] = µT+, we conclude E
T
[x0 − µt−] = 0, and we get from (16)
E
T
[(x0 − µt− − ct)2
2σ2t−
− (x0 − µt−)
2
2σ2t−
]
= E
T
[ c2t
2σ2t−
]
(17)
Adding (15) and (17) the lemma follows. uunionsq
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Fix any 0 < t < T . Then by (14)
c2t
2σ2t−
− c
2
T
2σ2T+
=
c2T
2σ4T+
(σ2t− − σ2T+) ≤ 0
because σ2T+/σ
2
t− = (1− q)T/t+ q ≥ 1.8
By the lemma
E
T
[∆W ] = E
T
[ c2t
2σ2t−
− c
2
T
2σ2T+
]
Since the expression under expectation is non-positive, so is the expectation, i.e., E
T
[∆W ] ≤ 0.
We conclude that for every T , for any expert policy, and independently of any other prediction
the expert has made or will make, the reward expectation for distorting a prediction at T is not
positive. If the allowed periods for prediction are fixed and unaffected by the value of the expert’s
prediction, the expert maximizes his multi-prediction benefit expectation by making a truthful
prediction at this particular prediction, and therefore at all predictions.
This completes the proof of Proposition 5. uunionsq
Therefore, truthfulness is best policy for the expert. Note that if the expert’s allowed prediction
schedule is not fixed, the result may no longer be true. E.g., if the expert is allowed further pre-
dictions only if the discrepancy between his last prediction and the market’s prediction exceeded
some threshold, the expert may be motivated to distort his prediction so as to be given further
prediction opportunities.
4.3 Prediction Reward Expectation
Having seen that there is no profit in lying, we shall from now on assume truthful predictions.
The following lemma will be useful in calculating the expected reward of a future prediction,
before some of the signals it is based on are known. It shows that current and historic signals affect
the reward expectation of the next prediction, but have no effect on the reward expectation of later
predictions.
Lemma 6. Assume that the expert is committed to making two consecutive predictions at T and
t < T . Let Xt− ∼ N(µ−, σ2−) and Xt+ ∼ N(µ+, σ2+) be the market’s distributions for x0 before and
after, respectively, a prediction µ+ is made at t.
Assume that σ2+ and σ
2− do not depend on any signals, but only on T, t and q. Then, at any
time τ ≥ T , the expected t-prediction reward is
E
τ
[Wt] = log
σ−
σ+
Proof. In proving this lemma we shall note that, since the market is Bayesian, later distributions are
conditional distributions on earlier ones. Specifically, they are conditional on signals and predictions
which became known since. This enables us to use general laws such as the Law of Total Expectation
and the Law of Total Variance which apply to conditional distributions.
We also use the result of Proposition 1, that, immediately after a prediction, market and expert
distributions are identical.
8 Or, more generally, σ2t− ≤ σ2T+, because Xt− is an inferred distribution from XT+.
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Throughout this lemma expectations are only over histories that conform to the
lemma conditions, i.e., histories that include consecutive predictions at T, t.
Since Xt+ is a conditional distribution on Xt− (Xt+ = Xt−|µ+), we may apply the Law of Total
Variance
V art−(Xt−) = E
t−
[V art+(Xt+)] + V art−(E
t+
[Xt+])
= E
t−
[V art+(Xt+)] + E
t−
[(
E
t+
[Xt+]− E
t−
[E
t+
[Xt+]]
)2]
(18)
We have V art−(Xt−) = σ2−, E
t+
[Xt+] = µ+, and as σ
2
+ does not depend on µ+, E
t−
[V ar(Xt+)] =
σ2+. By the Law of Total Expectation E
t−
[E
t+
[Xt+]] = E
t−
[Xt−] = µ−. Substituting in (18)
σ2− = σ
2
+ + E
t−
[(µ+ − µ−)2] (19)
As Xt− is conditional on XT+, by the Law of Total Expectation E
T+
[E
t−
[(µ+−µ−)2]] = E
T+
[(µ+−
µ−)2]. So, taking expectations at T+ of (19), and noting that variances are independent of signals
σ2− = σ
2
+ + E
T+
[(µ+ − µ−)2] (20)
Since immediately after a truthful prediction, market and expert’s distributions are identical,
(19) is true not only from the market’s point of view but also from the expert’s. We may therefore
substitute it in (4) (where expectations are taken over expert’s distribution) and get
E
T
[Wt] = −1
2
log
σ2+
σ2−
We mark the expectation E
T
[·], as the distinction before and after prediction is not relevant to
the expert.
It follows, using the lemma’s assumption that t, T, q are held constant, that E
T
[Wt] is constant.
Therefore, for any τ ≥ T , by the Law of Total Expectation
E
τ
[Wt] = E
τ
[E
T
[Wt]] = −1
2
log
σ2+
σ2−
= log
σ−
σ+
as claimed. uunionsq
We remark here that it is easy to verify in the proof above, that the lemma also holds a priori,
before the expert and market have received their first signal. Consequently by Proposition 3 the a
priori expected benefit of a first prediction is 12 log
1
1−q .
Another consequence is the following proposition
Proposition 6. Assume that the expert is committed to making two consecutive predictions at T
and t < T . Then, at or before T , the reward expectation of the latter prediction is
E[Wt] = −1
2
log
(
1− qT − t
T
)
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Proof. By Proposition 4 σ2− =
1
1
t
+ q
1−q
1
T
, while by Proposition 1 σ2+ = (1− q)t.
These depend on t, T and q only, so by Lemma 6, the reward expectation at every τ ≥ T is
E
τ
[Wt] = log
σ−
σ+
= −1
2
log
(
(1− q)t
[1
t
+
q
1− q
1
T
])
= −1
2
log
(
1− qT − t
T
)
uunionsq
We can now prove the main result: The best strategy is to make predictions whenever allowed,
and to make these predictions truthfully, as already shown (Proposition 5).
Theorem 1. If allowed periods for prediction are fixed, an expert maximizes his reward by making
predictions at every allowed period, speaking the truth at all predictions.
Here is an overview of the proof, which follows below.
The proof is by induction on the number of allowed remaining periods for prediction, so that
the induction assumption is that the expert will make truthful predictions in all k− 1 last allowed
periods, and the proof is completed by showing that the expert will also speak in the k’th last
period. We therefore need to show that, at the k’th last period, and whatever signals he is observing,
the expert gives higher reward expectation for making a prediction at this period (and all k − 1
subsequent ones), than to staying silent, and making the next prediction at the k− 1’th last period
(and all subsequent ones).
The reward expectation for all but the next prediction is calculated using Proposition 6. For
the next prediction, if it takes place at the k’th last period, the expectation is computed from
the expert’s observed signals, while if it takes place at the k − 1’th last period (i.e., in the future,
relative to when expectation is computed), the expectation is computed based on the fact that a
certain function of observed signals is a martingale. The total expectation is shown to be always
greater when making a prediction at the k’th last period.
Proof. Let K ⊆ [Tmax] be the allowed periods for prediction.
We shall prove the theorem by induction. To this end we revise the theorem claim as follows:
Claim: For every T , an expert maximizes his reward by making truthful predictions at every
period with t < T, t ∈ K (regardless of which signals he receives before or after T , and regardless
of his prediction history prior to T ).
Clearly when T = Tmax, this claim is equivalent to our theorem. We prove it by induction on
the number of remaining allowed periods for prediction n = n(T,K) := |K ∩ [T ]|.
For n = 1, the theorem is true, because, by Proposition 2, the expected reward for making each
truthful prediction is non-negative. When n = 1, this is also the total expected reward, and so is
weakly preferred to not making a prediction, a choice whose total reward is 0.
As the induction hypothesis, we assume the claim true for n− 1. We proceed to prove it for n:
Let A ∩ [T ] = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} with t1 > t2 > . . . > tn. By the induction hypothesis, the expert
will make predictions at all periods K \ t1. We must show that, for all histories at t1, an expert
who is informed of xt1 , yt1 prefers to make his next prediction immediately over making it at t2.
We treat two cases
(i) The expert has not already made a prediction, i.e., t1, t2 are the earliest periods in K.
17
Lemma 7. At T , for every t ≤ T
E
T
[(xt − yt)2] = t
2
T 2
(xT − yT )2 + q t(T − t)
T
Proof. According to the model
0 = (xt − yt)−
t∑
i=1
Ai
xT − yT = (xt − yt) +
T∑
i=t+1
Ai
Since −
t∑
i=1
Ai and
T∑
i=t+1
Ai are mutually independent, we have two independent observations
(0 and xT − yT ) of the random normal variable Xt − Yt, with variances qt and q(T − t),
respectively, which therefore has posterior distribution N(µ, σ2) with
µ =
0
qt +
xT−yT
q(T−t)
1
qt +
1
q(T−t)
=
t
T
(xT − yT )
σ2 =
1
1
qt +
1
q(T−t)
= q
t(T − t)
T
As the second moment of N(µ, σ2) is µ2 + σ2, the lemma follows. 9 uunionsq
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that speaking first at t2 does not carry a higher
expected reward than speaking first at t1, with reward expectations taken at t1.
By Propositions 3 and 6 and the induction hypothesis, the optimal reward expectation of an
expert whose first prediction is at t, which we denote by W≤t, is
E
t
[W≤t] =
1
2
[(xt − yt)2
t
− q + log(1− q)−
∑
ti<t
log(1− q ti−1 − ti
ti−1
)
]
(21)
By (21) and Lemma 7, the expert’s expectation of W≤t2 at t1 is
E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ] =
1
2
[ t2
t21
(xt1 − yt1)2 + q
t1 − t2
t1
− q + log(1− q)−
∑
ti<t2
log(1− q ti−1 − ti
ti−1
)
]
(22)
Now we show that E
t1
[W≤t1 ] ≥ E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]. By (22) and substituting t1 for t in (21)
E
t1
[W≤t1 ]− E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]
=
1
2
[ t1 − t2
t21
(xt1 − yt1)2 − q
t1 − t2
t1
− log(1− q t1 − t2
t1
)
]
>=
1
2
[
−q t1 − t2
t1
− log(1− q t1 − t2
t1
)
]
≥ 0
9 An alternative line of proof would be to show that xt−yt
t
is a martingale. We use this alternative method in the
other case.
18
Because for every x < 1, log(1− x) ≤ −x.
(ii) The expert has already made a prediction.
Suppose the expert’s last prediction was at T . If his next prediction is at t, his reward ex-
pectation (at t) for all subsequent predictions is, from (4), Proposition 6 and the induction
hypothesis
E
t
[W≤t] =
1
2
[(x∗t − yt)2
σ2t−
+
(σ2t+
σ2t−
− 1− log σ
2
t+
σ2t−
)
−
∑
ti<t
log(1− q ti−1 − ti
ti−1
)
]
(23)
where, by Propositions 1 and 4,
x∗t :=
xt
t +
1
1−q
yT
T − xTT
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
(24)
σ2t := σ
2
t− :=
1
1
t +
q
1−q
1
T
(25)
σ2t+ := (1− q)t (26)
So that
σ2t+/σ
2
t− = 1− q
T − t
T
(27)
We wish to show that, for every t1 > t2, the expert, given his signals at t1, prefers making a
prediction immediately (at t1), rather than later (at t2), i.e., that
E
t1
[W≤t1 ] ≥ E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]
To calculate E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ], the later expectation given present signals, we must derive a
distribution for (x∗t2 − yt2)|xt1 , yt1 . The following lemma answers this.
Lemma 8. For every τ < t the distribution of Zτ := (x
∗
τ − yτ )|xt, yt, xT , yT is normal with
µ(Zτ ) =
σ2τ
σ2t
(x∗t − yt) (28)
V ar(Zτ ) = q(t− τ)
[ 1
tτ
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
σ4τ (29)
Proof. We show that
x∗t−yt
σ2t
is a martingale. From (24) and (25)
x∗t − yt
σ2t
=
xt − yt
t
+
1
1− q
yT − yt
T
− xT − yt
T
=
xt − yt
t
+
q
1− q
yT − yt
T
− xT − yT
T
=
1
t
t∑
i=1
Ai +
q
(1− q)T
T∑
i=t+1
Bi − xT − yT
T
(30)
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Since the Ai’s are i.i.d., by symmetry for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t, E[Ai|xt, yt, xT , yT ] = xt−ytt . Clearly
E[Bi|xt, yt, xT , yT ] = 0, since knowing xt, yt, xT , yT provides no information on the distribution
of the Bi’s for i ≤ t. Conditioning (30) on xt, yt, xT , yT , we see that for every 1 ≤ τ ≤ t
E
t
[Zτ
σ2τ
]
=
Zt
σ2t
(31)
from which (28) follows.
From (30) we have
x∗τ − yτ
σ2τ
− x
∗
t − yt
σ2t
=
(1
τ
− 1
t
) τ∑
i=1
Ai − 1
t
t∑
i=τ+1
Ai +
q
(1− q)T
t∑
i=τ+1
Bi (32)
By the Law of Total Variance
V ar
(Zτ
σ2τ
)
= V ar
(x∗τ − yτ
σ2τ
)
− V ar
(x∗t − yt
σ2t
)
= V ar
(x∗τ − yτ
σ2τ
− x
∗
t − yt
σ2t
)
And so, since the terms of the right-hand side of (32) are mutually independent, we have
V ar
(Zτ
σ2τ
)
= V ar
(x∗τ − yτ
σ2τ
− x
∗
t − yt
σ2t
)
=
(1
τ
− 1
t
)2
qτ +
1
t2
q(t− τ) + q
2
(1− q)2T 2 (1− q)(t− τ)
= q(t− τ)
[ 1
tτ
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
from which (29) follows. uunionsq
Using Lemma 8 and (23), let us evaluate E
t1
[W≤t1 ] − E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ], the difference between
speaking at t1 and speaking at t2.
2
(
E
t1
[W≤t1 ]− E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]
)
=
1
σ2t1
(
1− σ
2
t2
σ2t1
)
(x∗t1 − yt1)2 − q(t1 − t2)
[ 1
t1t2
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
σ2t2
+
(
1− qT − t1
T
)− 1− log(1− qT − t1
T
)
− (1− qT − t2
T
)
+ 1 + log
(
1− qT − t2
T
)
− log(1− q t1 − t2
t1
)
=
1
σ2t1
(
1− σ
2
t2
σ2t1
)
(x∗t1 − yt1)2
+ q
t1 − t2
T
− q(t1 − t2)
[ 1
t1t2
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
σ2t2
− log
(
1− q T−t1T
)(
1− q t1−t2t1
)
1− q T−t2T
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Since σ2t is increasing in t, we have 1 −
σ2t2
σ2t1
> 0, and we get from the above the following
inequality
2
(
E
t1
[W≤t1 ]− E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]
)
> q
t1 − t2
T
− q(t1 − t2)
[ 1
t1t2
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
σ2t2
− log
(
1− q T−t1T
)(
1− q t1−t2t1
)
1− q T−t2T
(33)
Define
R := −q t1 − t2
T
+ q(t1 − t2)
[ 1
t1t2
+
q
(1− q)T 2
]
σ2t2 (34)
S := 1−
(
1− q T−t1T
)(
1− q t1−t2t1
)
1− q T−t2T
(35)
so that (33) can be rewritten
2
(
E
t1
[W≤t1 ]− E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ]
)
> −R− log(1− S)
Simplifying and rearranging (34) and (35), one discovers that R = S. Therefore, as for every
x < 1, log(1− x) ≤ −x, we conclude
E
t1
[W≤t1 ]− E
t1
[W≤t2 |xt1 , yt1 ] > 0
which settles this case.
uunionsq
Consequently if the expert is allowed to speak every period, he will. The following proposition
gives his reward expectation and its asymptotic behavior for large T .
Theorem 2. Assume the expert is allowed to make a prediction every period. Mark by Ξ(T ) the
average reward expectation at period T for an expert using optimal prediction strategy.
Ξ(T ) =
1
2
T∑
t=1
log
t
t− q (36)
=
1
2
log
Γ (1− q)Γ (T + 1)
Γ (T + 1− q) (37)
For large T , Ξ(T ) = O(log T ). More specifically
lim
T→∞
Ξ(T )
q log T + logΓ (1− q) =
1
2
(38)
Proof. The optimal policy is to predict at every period starting at T . The expected reward (averaged
over all random walks) for a first prediction at T is, by Lemma 6, 12 log
1
1−q , while for every t < T ,
it is, by Proposition 6, 12 log
t+1
t+1−q . (36) follows, and from it (37).
We use the following limit of the Gamma function: For α ∈ R
lim
n→∞
Γ (n+ α)
Γ (n)nα
= 1
(38) follows from this and (37) by substituting α = −q, n = T + 1. uunionsq
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5 Discussion
5.1 Conclusions
We analyzed the expert’s policy in the prediction scenario described, and found that an expert
should make a new, truthful prediction whenever he is allowed to and has an updated signal. For
large t, his total reward is on average roughly 12q log t. This compares to the asymptotic average
reward of q log log t that Azar et al. (2016) found is achievable by best policy of the expert when
restricted to a single prediction.
The ability to revise predictions therefore significantly increases the expert’s reward, by a factor
O( log tlog log t).
The results also show the answer to a related question: Suppose the market wishes to hire an
expert to publicly weigh in on the market price for the duration of the prediction period. The
results show that compensating the expert with the logarithmic scoring rule is incentive enough to
achieve this goal, and the expected expense is proportional to the expert’s expected reward.
5.2 Other Random Walks
In Section 1.5 we noted that our main results, and particularly the truthfulness property, does
not necessarily apply to any other model. It is an interesting open problem to characterize which
models do, in fact, lead to similar results. It needs reminding that our derivations depend on two
critical elements of our model:
1. Gaussian random walk
2. Variances of all signals and, as a result, of inferred distributions are common knowledge, and
consequently independent of signal values.
No similar results may apply, for example, in binary prediction markets (where there is a
0/1 outcome), because in the underlying Bernoulli distribution, a prediction p, representing the
distribution’s mean, also affects the distribution variance p(1− p).
5.3 Informational Substitutes
Chen and Waggoner (2016) formulate a criterion of “informational substitutes” as leading to being
truthful and revealing information at first opportunity, in a world where agents’ private information
is static. The definition used for “informational substitutes” is that information is more valuable
(per the scoring rule in force) earlier than later. While simply stated, working this out for any given
case may be involved.
We find the same, in our world where private information is dynamic. In that context, the
major part of the proof Theorem 1 was to show that expert and market’s signals are informational
substitutes.
Our result is therefore consistent with a generalization of Chen and Waggoner (2016) (and Chen
et al. (2010)) to dynamic-information contexts. We venture a guess that such a generalization will
prove to be valid. As our analysis shows, such a generalization is not straight-forward, but depends,
inter alia, on the behavior of interdependent martingales.
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5.4 Several Experts
Our results hold for a single expert. With more than one expert, neither truthfulness nor promptness
in revealing information is guaranteed, as we already know from static-information studies. It would
be useful to have a criterion to separate the truthful scenarios from the untruthful ones. As said
earlier, we believe that a generalization of Chen and Waggoner (2016)’s “informational substitutes”
to dynamic-information structures will prove to be such a criterion, even though working out that
criterion for any given setting might remain a non-trivial undertaking.
Where truthfulness and promptness are found to be optimal, the remaining question would
be the expected reward, the equivalent of our Theorem 2. Tie-breaking rules would be needed for
experts predicting simultaneously. The logical generalization of Theorem 2 is that each expert’s
expected reward will be asymptotically Q log t, where Q is a measure of the expert’s marginal
information per unit time (Q = 12q in the single-expert scenario).
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